

# **The Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership**

A Collaboration of Community Organizations, Private  
Corporations & Law Enforcement to Reduce Crime  
in the City of Minneapolis

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## Executive Summary

In 1995 the City of Minneapolis experienced a record high 97 homicides. As a result, in 1996 the Minneapolis Police Department collaborated with other law enforcement agencies and corporate partners in an effort called Minnesota HEALS (Health, Education, and Law & Safety). At the time, Chuck Wexler, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) facilitated police and community meetings to coordinate efforts and resources. HEALS helped to significantly reduce homicides in 1996 and 1997, and subsequent efforts led to additional reductions in UCR Part I crimes from 1998 through 2003.

This trend changed during 2004 with a 15% increase in homicides (from 46 in 2003 to 53 in 2004). Most significantly, there was a 211% increase in homicides in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct of North Minneapolis (from 9 in 2003 to 28 in 2004). This pattern continued during the first six months of 2005, with a 55% increase in homicides city-wide when compared to 2004 and 77% of these murders involved firearms.

Due to increasing violence in 2004 and early trends in 2005, the General Mills Foundation proposed replicating the Minnesota HEALS strategy. Chief William McManus accepted this offer and, along with Chuck Wexler, hosted initial meetings with law enforcement, corporate partners, Mayor R.T. Rybak, and citizen representatives. The goal of these meetings was to assess what was causing the increase in crime, identify existing efforts, and coordinate summer initiatives. The primary problems identified were gangs, guns, and drugs. During these meetings police and community strategies were developed to compliment existing efforts aimed at reducing crime during July and August of 2005. This initiative was dubbed the Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership (MSSP).

The General Mills Foundation, Target Corporation, U.S. Bank, Cub Foods, the Minneapolis Foundation, and the Minneapolis Empowerment Zone all contributed funding to extend the hours of six Minneapolis Parks at night in the most problematic neighborhoods. On average, 225 kids participated in the extended park hours each night and there were no violent assaults in those parks during the effort.

In addition, the MPD developed a coordinated law enforcement strategy to target gangs, guns, and drugs. This strategy was a collaborative effort with partners from local, state, and federal law enforcement, probation, and prosecutorial agencies. This strategy was designed to reduce duplication of efforts, establish unified command and coordinated leadership, assign clear accountability for specific gangs and problem locations, enhance the analysis and dissemination of intelligence, and leverage the MPD's limited resources. The goal was to reduce violence in the five most problematic neighborhoods in the City.

**The Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership was very successful in reducing the number of homicides (-33%) and people who were either shot or shot at (-4%) during July and August of 2005. There was also a 29% increase in the number of guns recovered when compared to the same period in 2004. In addition,**

**only one homicide occurred in the targeted neighborhoods and it does not appear that any of the homicides were motivated by gang activity or gang retaliation. During MSSP homicides were down 63% in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct and 67% in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct when compared to 2004.**

Although MSSP appears to have broken the increasing momentum of gang shootings and homicides, overall UCR Part I crime continued to be up when compared to 2004. This was driven in part by a 36% increase in domestic aggravated assaults and a 24% increase in robberies during July and August.

## **Background**

During the first six months of 2005 there was a significant increase in the number of homicides and aggravated assaults in the City of Minneapolis when compared to the previous two years. These crimes were fueled by gangs, guns, and drugs and they were seriously eroding the livability of the communities in which they occurred. This was especially apparent in five of the City's neighborhoods; Jordan, Hawthorne, McKinley, Phillips, and Central. These five neighborhoods accounted for the overwhelming majority of the violent crime.

When compared to the first six months of 2004;

- Homicides were up 55% Citywide (31 in 2005 compared to 20 in 2004).
- Homicides were up 50% in 3<sup>rd</sup> Pct (12 in 2005 compared to 8 in 2004).
- Homicides were up 40% in 4<sup>th</sup> Pct (14 in 2005 compared to 10 in 2004).
- Aggravated Assaults were up 24% Citywide (989 in 2005 compared to 798 in 2004).
- In addition, shootings accounted for 77% of the homicides in the first six months of 2005 (24 of the 31 were shootings).

The Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) was also managing significant budget cuts and subsequent reductions in staffing. State cuts to Local Government Aid reduced the MPD's budget starting in 2003. At the same time, the budget was affected by rising healthcare costs and pension obligations. In 2001 the MPD had 896 sworn officers. By 2005 the number of budgeted officers had been reduced to 794, a loss of 102 officers. In addition, 32 of these officers were funded by grants or special funding that restricted how they could be used. The cuts had also reduced the number of sworn 911 responders assigned to the precincts from 491 to 416, a loss of 75 officers.

These reductions prevented the MPD from pursuing many of the traditional proactive strategies that had proven successful in reducing crime. The MPD had also lost a "flex capacity" to saturate problematic areas in a timely manner. The Strategic Tactical Operations Patrol Unit (STOP), a 50 officer team created in April of 2005 by Chief McManus, had become the primary proactive patrol unit in the City. However, STOP was becoming overwhelmed with requests for assistance and the precincts were struggling to find solutions to emerging crime patterns that went across and beyond their

boundaries. Chief McManus also noticed a great deal of overlap in the work of MPD units and other agencies in relation to gangs.

## **Developing a Strategy**

Due to the increasing violence in 2004 and the early trends in 2005, The General Mills Foundation, a long-time corporate partner, contacted the MPD with a proposal to help. They offered to try to replicate a 1996 effort (Minnesota HEALS) with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) which provided consultation to the MPD and its local, state, and federal partners. Chuck Wexler, the Executive Director of PERF, orchestrated the successful crime reduction strategy in 1996 and 1997. At that time, PERF led a collaborative effort involving the police, law enforcement partners, the community, non-profits, and private corporations. This effort significantly reduced the number of murders and aggravated assaults during 1996 and 1997.

Chief McManus accepted General Mills' offer and during February and March of 2005 he and Chuck Wexler held a series of meetings with members of the community, private corporations, charitable foundations, non-profit groups, Hennepin County Community Corrections, and the Police Department. These meetings were designed to solicit input, identify what was already being done by agencies and organizations, assess crime trends in Minneapolis, and develop strategies for reducing the number of murders and aggravated assaults in the City. Specifically, PERF was looking for ways to maximize the effectiveness of the community and the MPD to insure that limited resources were being used as efficiently as possible. Lieutenant Andy Smith, from the MPD's 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct, was assigned as a liaison to the PERF team.

## **The Community Assessment**

As mentioned above, beginning in February of 2005 PERF conducted a series of meetings designed to gain insight from a variety of community members. The participants represented a cross-section of residents, property owners, business owners, neighborhood organizations, and the Police Community Relations Council. The Minneapolis Empowerment Zone and Minneapolis Community Planning also played a critical role in soliciting community input and developing solutions.

Representatives from the following organizations participated in the process;

- **Police Community Relations Council**
- **Hawthorne Area Community Council**
- **Jordan Area Community Council**
- **Folwell Neighborhood Association**
- **Phillips Neighborhood Organization**
- **Mad Dads**
- **Minnesota Black Chamber of Commerce**
- **Minneapolis Urban League**

The message from the community was clear. Residents no longer felt safe in their neighborhoods and they demanded a multi-faceted approach to reducing crime. They believed that gang violence and narcotics were the driving forces behind a degradation in the livability of their communities, and they knew that these problems could not be solved by the police alone. The gang-related problems of guns, drugs and violence were not new, but the nature of the gangs had changed. Residents were seeing younger and less organized groups fighting for smaller territories. And, most of the gang members were selling marijuana rather than crack cocaine or other narcotics. These citizen groups understood that the solution needed to involve recreational opportunities for youth, employment opportunities for adults, and social services for those needing assistance.

In addition, they expected the police to be proactive about reducing violent crime. The community was frustrated by what they described as “open-air drug markets” in some of the most problematic areas. Residents and property owners demanded that the police actively pursue enforcement in these areas. One of their chief concerns was individuals who come to these areas from the suburbs and other neighborhoods to buy drugs. The community wanted these people to be arrested and they wanted to send a clear message about how this affects the livability of the neighborhood.

The community also knew that reducing violent crime would require both increased presence and increased enforcement by the MPD. They were willing to support and encourage these efforts, but appealed to the MPD to treat people with respect and to be cognizant of the fact that the overwhelming majority of residents are not involved in criminal activity.

Community members and neighborhood organizations also recognized the need to closely involve social service agencies and non-profit groups in developing a solution. It was important to them to provide alternative activities for youth and young adults. They also wanted to encourage access to counseling, intervention services, and job training for individuals who wanted them. This created a crucial role for many of the agencies with a record of serving the community.

Some of the agencies that committed to providing these services were;

- **Mad Dads**
- **The Minneapolis Urban League**
- **The Minnesota Black Chamber of Commerce**
- **Step Up - Achieve Minneapolis Summer Jobs Program**
- **Pillsbury House**
- **Minneapolis Empowerment Zone**
- **Minneapolis Community Planning**
- **Folwell Neighborhood Association**

## **Corporate and Foundation Support**

Chief McManus, Chuck Wexler and the PERF team also met regularly with representative of private corporations and charitable foundations which had demonstrated

a commitment to the community. The General Mills Foundation, represented by Executive Director Ellen Luger, provided funding for PERF and played a key role in both coordinating and financing other components of the Strategic Safety Partnership.

The corporate partners included the following;

- **General Mills Foundation**
- **Target Corporation**
- **US Bank**
- **Cub Foods**
- **The Minneapolis Foundation**

Specifically, the General Mills Foundation (\$25,000), Target Corporation (\$25,000), Cub Foods (\$25,000), the Minneapolis Foundation (\$20,000), and the Minneapolis Empowerment Zone (\$5,000) teamed up with the Minneapolis Parks and several non-profit agencies to provide funding to keep six Minneapolis Park buildings open at night and open additional hours during the summer. Sites were chosen in the three most problematic neighborhoods of both North and South Minneapolis.

The park buildings were open until 10:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday and offered a variety of sports and activities to kids ages 12 to 17. Kids were encouraged to participate in basketball games, dance lessons, cooking classes, art programs, music production, mentoring programs, and many other activities. In addition, representatives from community organizations and non-profits provided adult role models and other services to the youth.

On average 225 kids participated in the extended park programs each night. A survey at the conclusion of the program determined that 57% of the youth attended the parks 3 or more nights per week and 80% of them participated in park programs for the first time as a result of this effort. An overwhelming 99% of the kids said that they would attend if this effort was repeated in 2006. One single mother who works evenings stated, "I was more at ease knowing my children were at the park while I was gone."

## **The Role of Probation and Parole**

Hennepin County Community Corrections had been a key player in efforts to reduce crime in 1996 and 1997. Since that time they had continued to build on successful efforts to reduce crime involving individuals who were under current supervision. John O'Sullivan, Jim Robertson and Terri Hoy, Supervisors of Probation & Parole, had maintained a close working relationship with the MPD and were actively involved in the development of the Strategic Safety Partnership.

Representatives of Probation and Parole attended each of the police and community meetings and offered valuable insight. In addition, they committed staff and resources to support the MPD's efforts to reduce crime.

Below are just a few of the strategies implemented by Probation and Parole;

- Probation & Parole committed to providing several probation officers each day to work with the MPD and conduct home-visits. These visits were focused on individuals who were most likely to be involved in violent crime.
- Probation met with Hennepin County judges and secured their commitment to impose geographic restrictions on probationers who continued to violate the terms of their release.
- Probation assisted with attempts to prevent retaliation by conducting home visits of gang members and warning them of increased restrictions, and even incarceration, if they pursued retaliation.
- Probation changed their method of case assignment to allow probation officers to specialize in specific gangs. This gave the police a specific contact for each active gang.
- Probation and Parole also participated in every major collaborative patrol detail during the Strategic Safety Partnership.

## **Focusing the Efforts of the MPD and Our Criminal Justice Partners**

In February and March of 2005, Chief McManus, Chuck Wexler and the PERF team scheduled private meetings with key individuals in the Minneapolis Police Department and other Criminal Justice agencies. The primary goal of PERF was to conduct an analysis of violent crime in 2004 and identify the factors leading to the increase in homicides. These meetings were also designed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the MPD, determine what was driving the increase in violent crime, and solicit input on strategies to reduce murders and aggravated assaults.

These meetings included individuals from the following areas;

- MPD Administration
- Homicide Unit
- Violent Offender Task Force
- State Gang Strike Force
- Precinct Commanders
- U.S. Attorney's Office
- Hennepin County Attorney's Office
- Minneapolis City Attorney's Office
- FBI Violent Crime Squad
- Narcotics Unit
- Hennepin County Community Corrections (Probation & Parole)
- MPD CODEFOR & Crime Analysis Unit

PERF also facilitated several meetings attended by commanders from the MPD and other local, state and federal police agencies. These meetings were designed to discuss violent crime in Minneapolis and solicit ideas for collaborative efforts to reduce violence. The group agreed that the primary problems were gangs, guns, and drugs. A recurring theme in the meetings was a lack of resources and personnel. Chuck Wexler encouraged

the attendees to be creative and assured them that they would not be receiving additional personnel or financial resources.

At these meetings Commanders from the Minneapolis Police Homicide and Organized Crime Units discussed trends in murders and gang-related shootings. Commanders from the Narcotics Unit and DEA discussed trends in drug sales, seizures, and the related violence. A Commander from the Minnesota Gang Strike Force discussed gang trends and specific problem areas in the City. And, representatives from the U.S. Marshall's Office, FBI, ATF, DEA, U.S. Secret Service, Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, and Metro Transit Police offered insight and assistance to the effort.

In April of 2005 PERF delivered the "Minneapolis Homicide Assessment", a report outlining their analysis of homicide data from 2004. This report summarized homicide data from 2004 and identified factors contributing to the homicide cases. Following the release of the report, PERF met with members of the Police Community Relations Council and other neighborhood groups to brief them and solicit their advice on strategies to reduce the number of homicides and aggravated assaults.

Some of the findings in the Minneapolis Homicide Assessment include;

- There was a 15% increase in homicides citywide during 2004 (from 46 to 53).
- There was a 211% increase in homicides in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct (from 9 to 28).
- The 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Precincts accounted for 89% of the City's homicides and 64 percent of the City's aggravated assaults.
- 15 of the homicides (or 28%) were identified as gang-related and 5 of them were retaliation for previous incidents.
- 9 of the homicides (or 17%) were identified as drug-related.
- Three neighborhoods (Phillips, Hawthorne, & Jordan) accounted for 45% of the City's homicides.
- Of the 53 homicides, 16 of the victims were documented gang members and 17 of the suspects were documented gang members.
- 70% of the suspects were on active felony probation or parole when they committed the murder.
- 42 of the 53 homicides (or 79%) were shootings. This continued in the first six months of 2005 with shootings accounting for 24 of the 31 homicides (or 77%).

In addition to the above assessment, PERF worked with the Minnesota Gang Strike Force (MGSF) to develop a list of the most active gangs and problem locations in the City. The list was compiled based on current crime analysis, and input from both the police and the community. The MGSF then created maps identifying the most problematic locations in the City and the identified territories of the most active gangs. These maps became a blueprint for what needed to be done to reduce murders and aggravated assaults in the City.

Chuck Wexler and Lt. Smith also met with judges from the Hennepin County Bench to seek their assistance with chronic and violent individuals. These judges included those in charge of Drug Court, Juvenile Court, Community Court, and the Chief Judge. The

judges agreed to consider information about these individuals and to impose stricter geographic restrictions if appropriate.

## **Developing a Strategic Plan**

The goal of the summer initiative was to reduce the violence resulting from gangs, guns, and drugs. The analysis had shown that we knew the individuals and the gangs involved, but we lacked a coordinated approach. In June of 2005 Chief William McManus asked Capt. Mike Martin to return from the Minnesota Gang Strike Force and assume command of the initiative. His directive was to reduce murders and aggravated assaults during July and August by coordinating a city-wide approach to active gangs, problem locations, and violent individuals. This strategy was dubbed the Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership (MSSP).

Capt. Martin had supervised the Minneapolis Police Gang Strike Force and had worked closely with PERF during the successful strategy in 1996 and 1997. He had also been involved in the current initiative from the beginning as the Metro Commander of the Minnesota Gang Strike Force. He quickly came forward with an operational plan, which was immediately adopted by Chief McManus.

Under the direction of Chief William McManus, Assistant Chief Tim Dolan, and Patrol Bureau Deputy Chief Sharon Lubinski, Captain Martin assumed temporary command of the Violent Offender Task Force (VOTF), Intelligence Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC), Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (VCAT), Narcotics Unit, Strategic Tactical Operations Patrol Unit (STOP), the Minnesota Gang Strike Force (MGSF), and the precinct Community Response Teams (CRT).

Capt. Martin, through consultation with other MPD Commanders, reviewed the findings of PERF and conducted an assessment of the MPD's operations and relationships with other agencies. With the MPD's limited resources in mind, Capt. Martin identified five crucial components for a successful strategy;

- Reduce duplication of efforts amongst the MPD's proactive units, investigative units and other agencies.
- Establish unified command and coordinated leadership of the MPD's proactive units.
- Assign clear ownership and accountability for specific gangs and problem locations.
- Enhance the analysis and timely dissemination of intelligence within the MPD.
- Leverage the MPD's limited resources by increasing collaborative efforts with other law enforcement agencies.

In addition to the temporary reorganization of the MPD, the following changes were made to facilitate the strategy;

- Lt. Jeff Rugel assumed the position of Metro Region Commander for the Minnesota Gang Strike Force.

- Sgt. Dave Burbank was transferred from the Assault Unit to the Organized Crime Unit to improve his ability to track and investigate Native Gangs.
- Lt. Greg Reinhardt was assigned to Capt. Martin to assist with statistical analysis and technological support.

## **The Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership**

On July 1, 2005 the City of Minneapolis initiated its 2005 Strategic Safety Partnership (MSSP), a 61-day crime prevention strategy designed to reduce the number of homicides and aggravated assaults in the five most problematic neighborhoods of the City. The goal of MSSP was to reduce violent crime citywide and improve the livability of the Jordan, Hawthorne, McKinley, Phillips, and Central Neighborhoods. The MPD's efforts were specifically focused in Sector 2 of the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct (Jordan, Hawthorne, & McKinley) and Sectors 1 & 2 of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct (Phillips & Central).

Capt. Martin convened a meeting with Commanders and individuals in key positions throughout the MPD and presented the MSSP Strategic Plan. Each officer was asked to keep this thought in mind;

**“Our goal is to make the neighborhoods safer for the 5 year-old kid that can’t play in his own yard because the gang members are selling drugs on the corner and shooting at each other.”**

At this meeting Commanders were assigned ownership and accountability for each of the active gangs and problem locations in the target areas. Mutually agreeable adjustments were made to some of the assignments and the strategy was finalized. The Commanders were then assigned the first of what would later be called “Momentum Tasks”. These tasks were developed weekly to keep each unit focused on their assignments and progressing toward mutual goals.

The first Momentum Task was due on Friday, July 8<sup>th</sup> and included the following;

- A list of the 10 individuals in each of your assigned gangs or problem locations who are most likely to be involved in murders or aggravated assaults.
- Include full name, most recent address, probation status, and the name of P.O. if applicable.
- The name of the individual supervisor or officer who will be responsible for each gang or problem location and their contact numbers.
- A brief plan for targeting that gang or problem area.

As soon as the names of the most active individuals were received, they were forwarded to the Business Technology Unit and entered into an automatic e-mail notification system. This system automatically notified the assigned officer if one of their individuals had any documented contact with the MPD.

Subsequent Momentum Tasks required supervisors to develop collaborative details, conduct probation visits, assist on directed patrol operations, solicit feedback from their

officers, and recognize officers for outstanding performance (For a complete list of Momentum Tasks see Appendix A).

The MSSP Initiative led to several major changes in MPD operations and collaborative efforts;

- The MPD's Administration and Unit Commanders met regularly with Chuck Wexler from PERF, with the Commanders of federal, state, and local police agencies, and with supervisors from Hennepin County Probation & Parole to insure cooperation and design collaborative efforts.
- Each proactive unit was assigned responsibility and ultimate accountability for at least one gang and/or problem location. That unit was responsible for documenting and disseminating intelligence related to their assignment and developing strategies to reduce violence related to their gang(s) and/or problem locations.
- The Intelligence Unit (ISAC) provided a liaison officer for each proactive unit to analyze intelligence and provide technical support.
- Prior to SSP, the ISAC Unit created a Weekly Intelligence Bulletin. This Bulletin continued, but was supplemented with daily intelligence updates (For an example of the SSP Daily see Appendix B).
- The Minnesota Gang Strike Force partnered with MPD Units and accepted responsibility for developing strategies to target specific gangs.
- After each gang-related shooting or incident unit commanders created a strategy to prevent retaliation. These strategies often included probation visits on potential retaliators, consensual conversations with the victim's fellow gang members, and increased patrol near known gang hangouts.
- The Violent Offender Task Force (VOTF) focused their efforts on identifying and targeting the individuals who were most likely to be involved in murders or aggravated assaults. Their work was a balance of surveillance, targeted patrol, and short term investigations to recover guns.
- The STOP Unit commander met regularly with members of the community to identify problem areas and redirect proactive patrols. STOP also became a patrol resource for the investigative units and conducted probation visits on the individuals identified as most likely to be involved in a murder or assault.
- Each unit was responsible for working with Hennepin County Probation to enforce conditions of probation, parole, or conditional release related to their area of responsibility. Probation also designated a specific probation officer for each identified gang.
- The ATF, DEA, U.S. Marshall's, FBI, and HUD all provided personnel and played a key role in SSP efforts.
- The Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, Department of Corrections, and Metro Transit Police also provided assistance with saturation details and warrant sweeps.

## **MSSP Assignments**

The Strategic Safety Partnership required each proactive unit within the MPD and each outside agency to fulfill a unique role in a collaborative effort to reduce crime. This section outlines the responsibility accepted by each MPD unit and their Federal, State, and local partners. It also includes highlights of their success in preventing violence.

### **Intelligence Sharing & Analysis Center (ISAC) – Lt. Tony Diaz & Sgt. Rick Duncan**

ISAC performed the crucial function of acting as a clearinghouse for information and intelligence that was developed during SSP. Each morning they reviewed incidents involving the active gangs and problem locations and provided analysis to other units and agencies. This included a daily SSP Update and a Weekly Intelligence Update. ISAC also hosted weekly intelligence meetings involving all of the units and agencies.

In addition to the above duties, the ISAC Unit accepted responsibility for three of the most problematic gangs on the Northside. These three gangs had all been involved in recent violence and were very likely to be involved in murders during July and August.

ISAC also assigned intelligence officers to each of the units responsible for a gang or problem location. These officers assisted with crime analysis, intelligence support, and documentation of gang affiliation.

### **MPD – ATF Weapons Task Force – Sgt. Mike Taylor & ATF**

The MPD – ATF Weapons Task Force was a collaborative unit created prior to the MSSP. This task force was responsible for investigating every in-custody weapons arrest that occurred during the initiative. In addition, the ATF conducted weapons traces on each of the firearms recovered to determine how the gun was obtained. The Weapons Task Force also conducted proactive investigations to target straw purchasers of firearms.

Much of the proactive efforts of the Weapons Task Force focused on working with the Violent Offender Task Force to recover firearms stolen by gang members during a Richfield Gun Store robbery. These guns were brought to the Northside of Minneapolis and distributed to other gang members.

In addition, the ATF adopted a straw purchasing case that was initiated by the Minnesota Gang Strike Force. The suspect in this case, a crack addict, traded his personal collection of firearms for crack cocaine and then began making straw purchases for gang members who were convicted felons.

### **Violent Offender Task Force (VOTF) – Lt. Mike Carlson & Sgt. Pat King**

The Violent Offender Task Force is a multi-agency task force that was created to conduct medium and long-term investigations of the most violent offenders in Minneapolis. VOTF includes members from the MPD, ATF, FBI, U.S. Secret Service, Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, U.S. Attorney's Office, Hennepin County Attorney's Office and other agencies when needed. During MSSP the Violent Offender Task Force

adjusted their operations to accommodate some short-term investigations and targeted plainclothes operations.

VOTF assumed responsibility for the several of the most active and violent gangs in the City. The work of VOTF effectively eliminated the threat of what was arguably the most violent and fastest growing gang on the Northside. VOTF targeted this gang with everything from historical case review and charging, to relentless patrol presence, and strict enforcement of probationary conditions.

VOTF also targeted one of the most violent gang members. This individual had been involved in at least two murders and one shooting in 2004 and was present at the scene of another murder in 2005. The investigative efforts of VOTF led to a search warrant of his home and the recovery of several ounces of cocaine. He was charged federally and is awaiting trial.

VOTF's work during SSP led to 39 arrests, 5 Federal cases, and the recovery of 17 guns. Many of these guns were recovered during cooperative efforts with other units.

#### **Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (VCAT) – Sgt. Al Kramer**

The Violent Criminal Apprehension Team is a cooperative effort of the MPD and the U.S. Marshall's Service. VCAT played a vital role in efforts to reduce violence during MSSP. VCAT was not assigned specific duties, but rather, was responsible for the location and apprehension of individuals identified as suspects in violent crime. They were responsible for arresting suspects in the overwhelming majority of murders and aggravated assaults during MSSP. The quick work of VCAT may have prevented several violent incidents.

#### **Narcotics Unit – Lt. Mark Ellenberg, Sgt. Jeff Miller & Sgt. Liz Dea**

The MPD Narcotics Unit worked collaboratively with the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office and the DEA to target narcotics traffickers who were bringing drugs into Minneapolis. During MSSP they also adjusted their operations to focus on dealers that were active at some of the most problematic locations in the City.

The Narcotics Unit conducted several surveillance, buy/bust, and arrest details at Johnny A's 200 Club. This location had been the scene of several murders and numerous shootings in recent years. It was also identified as a hangout for members of some of the most violent gangs in Minneapolis.

The Narcotics Unit also adopted cases to target several gang members who had been involved in drug or gang-related murders and shootings on the Northside, Downtown, and in St. Paul. Their efforts led to Federal charges against several of these individuals.

The Narcotics Unit also partnered with the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT Team and STOP Unit to conduct reverse drug stings. These units used undercover officers and informants to pose as drug dealers and then arrested individuals who had come to the area to buy

narcotics. One of these details received a great deal of publicity in a KARE 11 news story. In addition, the Narcotics Unit conducted surveillance and arrested buyers at Johnny A's 200 Club.

**Minnesota Gang Strike Force (MGSF) – Lt. Jeff Rugel, Sgt. John Pyka (SPPD)**

The Minnesota Gang Strike Force accepted responsibility for several of the most violent gangs on the Southside.

During MSSP, officers from the MGSF and 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct CRT Team combined to conduct investigations and street patrol to reduce violence related to the most active gang in the Central Neighborhood. These efforts led to the charging of several members of the gang and the closing of at least one business the gang used to sell narcotics.

MGSF officers also worked closely with the Native American Task Force, Department of Corrections, and DEA to target violent members of the most active gangs in the Native American community. Their efforts may have led to the prevention of several shootings and assaults through the use of informants and monitoring of prison phone calls. They were also able to charge and convict several of the most violent members of these gangs.

In addition to the above efforts, the MGSF assisted with the documentation and maintenance of gang intelligence in the State's GangNet database. This information was available to all of the units and agencies involved in MSSP. MGSF also performed crime mapping and link analysis for at least two MSSP investigations.

**Native American Task Force (NATF) – Sgt. Dave Burbank**

Sgt. Dave Burbank's position is funded through a Project Safe Neighborhoods grant from the U.S. Attorney's Office. He is responsible for working with investigators throughout the State of Minnesota who work cases involving Native American gangs. During MSSP his work was primarily focused on reducing violence in and around the Little Earth Housing Community of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct.

Sgt. Burbank worked closely with the Minnesota Gang Strike Force, 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct CRT Team, and Hennepin County Probation to target the most violent members of Native American gangs. He also coordinated several multi-agency details which included warrant sweeps, proactive patrol, buy/bust details, and probation checks. During one of these details alone, 5 felony suspects were apprehended in separate incidents within the first hour of the detail.

**Strategic Tactical Operations Patrol Unit (STOP) – Lt. Medaria Arradondo**

The STOP Unit was created in April of 2005 to provide a proactive patrol unit to support the precincts in the most problematic areas of the City. During MSSP the STOP Unit Commander, Lt. Arradondo, met regularly with the PCRC and other members of the community to identify areas in need of enhanced patrol. STOP also designated an intelligence officer who analyzed daily intelligence and provided direction to the Unit.

STOP was a tremendous asset in reducing violence in both the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Precincts. STOP was able to fill a void left by past budget cuts and subsequent reductions in staffing. They also supplemented precinct staff when the call load was excessive. Their efforts routinely led to the recovery of guns and narcotics.

One of the tactics used by STOP was to have Off. Grant Snyder, the Intelligence Officer, conduct undercover surveillance in an area where they had received citizen complaints. He would then call in marked squads to apprehend individuals he had seen buying or selling drugs. During one such operation, he observed a vehicle park near him and two individuals exit the car. As the individuals crouched behind a tree, Off. Snyder noticed that one of them was holding a gun and they appeared to be waiting to ambush a male who was walking down the sidewalk. Off. Snyder was able to call in marked cars and the suspects were apprehended after a short foot chase. Officers recovered a cocked and loaded .45 caliber, semi-automatic handgun from one of the suspects. There is no doubt that the officers prevented a shooting and possibly a murder.

### **1st Precinct Community Response Team (CRT) – Lt. Bret Lindback**

The 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct CRT Team's primary responsibility during MSSP was to provide intelligence to the other units about incidents which occurred Downtown that may lead to retaliation in the other precincts. In addition they conducted several collaborative details targeting gang hangouts in the Warehouse District. One of these details was focused on reducing violence related to an ongoing feud between rival gangs, which had led to several incidents Downtown.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct CRT Team provided officers for collaborative details in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Precincts and they were also responsible for tracking incidents involving Somali gangs.

### **2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct Community Response Team (CRT) – Sgt. Tom Stiller**

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct CRT Team's primary responsibility during MSSP was to provide personnel to collaborative details in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Precincts. They also provided intelligence to other units about incidents which occurred in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct that may lead to retaliation in the other precincts.

### **3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Community Response Team (CRT) – Lt. Rick Thomas**

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct CRT Team accepted responsibility for preventing violence associated with five of the most active gangs on the Southside, including the two most active gangs in the Latino community. They also partnered with the MGSF to target the most active gang in the Central Neighborhood. CRT Team members quickly responded to any incidents involving their assigned gangs and immediately worked to prevent retaliation.

In one incident, gang members drove by and shot a member of a rival gang on the corner of Lake Street and Park Avenue South. Members of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct CRT Team and the MGSF responded to the scene. Sgt. Pommerenke then contacted the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Directed Patrol who spent the rest of the night making contact with gang members on the

victim's side and warning them about retaliation. The following night they followed-up by conducting probation visits on the members who had current conditions. While they were doing this, the 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT Team was conducting similar visits on members of the rival side.

In addition to the above responsibilities, Lt. Sally Weddell coordinated details in the problem locations along the Bloomington Corridor and Franklin Avenue and Lt. Dan Roen coordinated efforts in the area around Park and Lake. These efforts were focused by using "Clean Sheets" that identified chronic offenders.

The Metro Transit Police also helped in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct by doubling their patrols in some of the most problematic locations. This helped to reduce violence at and around bus stops.

#### **4<sup>th</sup> Precinct Community Response Team (CRT) – Lt. Dave Hayhoe**

The 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT Team accepted responsibility for several problem locations on the Northside; 31<sup>st</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Street N., 24<sup>th</sup> and Lyndale Avenue N., and Broadway and Bryant. Lt. Dave Hayhoe and Sgt. Steve Mosey coordinated details to target street level drug dealing, prostitution, and livability offenses in these areas.

4<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT also conducted several multi-agency saturations to reduce violence in the problem areas. These saturations led to multiple narcotics arrests and several recovered guns. During one multi-agency detail on August 18<sup>th</sup>, 43 officers participated. This detail led to several felony arrests and the recovery of one sawed-off rifle and one .22 caliber, semi-automatic handgun in separate incidents.

The Metro Transit Police Department provided assistance in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct by doubling their presence in the areas that had been identified as the most problematic in the precinct. This helped to reduce crime at and around bus stops.

#### **5<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT & Directed Patrol – Lt. Sue Piontek**

The 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT and Directed Patrol Units assumed responsibility for reducing violence associated with the most active gang in the 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct. This gang had become extremely active and was involved in at least one murder and several shootings just prior to the start of MSSP. 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT did an outstanding job of keeping constant pressure on this gang and preventing violence related to their ongoing feuds with several rival gangs.

Off. Jason Hurley disseminated an intelligence update on the target gang almost daily. This update included information about incidents involving the gang, known hangouts, current warrants for members, and recommendations for daily details.

5<sup>th</sup> Precinct CRT and DP officers also provided personnel for collaborative details in both the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Precincts.

## The Results

The goal of the Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership (MSSP) was to reduce gang violence – specifically, the rising number of shootings and murders. The initiative started on July 1, 2005 and ended on August 31, 2005. During MSSP homicides were down 33% when compared to 2004 (12 in 2004 and 8 in 2005). In addition, the 2005 number includes two self-defense homicides, one officer who shot and killed a suspect and one woman who was defending herself from a domestic assault. During MSSP homicides were down 63% in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct (Northside) and down 67% in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct (Southside).

### Percentage Change in Murders Before & During MSSP

	1/1/04 – 6/30/04	1/1/05 – 6/30/05	% Change Pre-MSSP	7/1/04 – 8/31/04	7/31/05 – 8/31/05	% Change During MSSP
<b>Precinct 1</b>	1	1	<b>0%</b>	1	1	<b>0%</b>
<b>Precinct 2</b>	0	2	<b># DIV/0!</b>	0	0	<b>0%</b>
<b>Precinct 3</b>	8	12	<b>+ 50%</b>	3	1	<b>- 67%</b>
<b>Precinct 4</b>	10	14	<b>+ 40%</b>	8	3	<b>-63%</b>
<b>Precinct 5</b>	1	2	<b>+ 100%</b>	0	3	<b>#DIV/0!</b>
<b>Citywide</b>	20	31	<b>+ 55%</b>	12	8	<b>- 33%</b>

Perhaps most importantly, none of the homicides during MSSP appear to be related to gang retaliation or gang activity. This is in stark contrast to 6 murders involving gang activity or retaliation during the same period in 2004. In addition, only one of the murders during MSSP occurred in the five most problematic neighborhoods, compared to 7 in these neighborhoods during the same period in 2004.

Four of the murders during MSSP were directly related to robberies. This is a reflection of an overall 26% increase in robberies during MSSP. Although this was not an area of focus for SSP it will be a focus for continuing efforts. There was some empirical evidence to suggest that pressure on narcotics locations during MSSP may have led to an increase in robberies in adjacent areas as drug dealers sought alternative methods to obtain money.

While the MSSP Initiative achieved measurable success in reducing homicides and shootings, aggravated assaults continued to be problematic. Aggravated assaults were up 24% citywide during the first six months of 2005 and continued to be up 26% during MSSP. This included a 17% increase in non-domestic aggravated assaults and a 36% increase in domestic aggravated assaults. According to the Commander of the Family Violence Unit, some of the increase in domestic assaults is attributable to changes in reporting that began on August 1<sup>st</sup>. During MSSP aggravated assaults were up 12% in

the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct (Southside) and up 42% in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct (Northside). However, there were no shootings or murders at or related to any of the Minneapolis Parks.

**Percentage Change in Aggravated Assaults  
Before & During MSSP**

	<b>1/1/04 – 6/30/04</b>	<b>1/1/05 – 6/30/05</b>	<b>% Change Pre-MSSP</b>	<b>7/1/04 – 8/31/04</b>	<b>7/31/05 – 8/31/05</b>	<b>% Change During MSSP</b>
<b>Precinct 1</b>	113	134	+ 19%	50	65	+ 30%
<b>Precinct 2</b>	79	99	+25%	23	39	+ 70%
<b>Precinct 3</b>	202	273	+ 35%	102	114	+ 12%
<b>Precinct 4</b>	310	365	+ 18%	123	175	+ 42%
<b>Precinct 5</b>	94	118	+ 26%	50	46	- 8%
<b>Citywide</b>	798	989	+ 24%	348	439	+ 26%

We believe that a good measure of MSSP’s success was the number of individuals who were shot or shot at. Much of the MSSP strategy was focused on reducing this number during July and August. Prior to MSSP the number of people who were either shot or shot at was up 5% year-to-date when compared to 2004. During MSSP the number of people who were either shot or shot at was down 4% when compared to the same period in 2004. This number also represented a 14% reduction when compared to the average number of shootings during this period over the last 3 years.

**Percentage Change in Shootings  
Before & During MSSP**

	<b>Jan.-June 2004</b>	<b>Jan-June 2005</b>	<b>% Change Pre-MSSP</b>	<b>July – Aug. 2004</b>	<b>July-Aug. 2005</b>	<b>% Change During MSSP</b>
<b>Victims Shot Or Shot At</b>	276	293	+ 6%	113	108	- 4%

During MSSP there was a 29% increase in gun seizures citywide. This was on top of a 33% increase in gun seizures prior to MSSP. The 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct led the way with 101 guns seized during MSSP, a 35% increase when compared to July and August of 2004. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct had the largest percentage increase with a 283% increase over 2004. Many of these seizures were related to proactive patrol by the STOP Unit and precinct officers and targeted investigations by the Violent Offender Task Force (VOTF).

**Percentage Change in Guns Seized  
Before & During MSSP**

	<b>1/1/04 – 6/30/04</b>	<b>1/1/05 – 6/30/05</b>	<b>% Change Pre-MSSP</b>	<b>7/1/04 – 8/31/04</b>	<b>7/31/05 – 8/31/05</b>	<b>% Change During MSSP</b>
<b>Precinct 1</b>	37	35	- 5%	13	10	- 23%
<b>Precinct 2</b>	38	46	+ 21%	6	23	+ 283%
<b>Precinct 3</b>	92	133	+45%	48	37	- 23%
<b>Precinct 4</b>	159	221	+ 39%	75	101	+ 35%
<b>Precinct 5</b>	43	57	+33%	8	22	+ 175 %
<b>Citywide</b>	369	492	+33 %	150	193	+ 29%

In summary, the Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership was tremendously successful in reducing the number of murders in Minneapolis during July and August of 2005. If you remove the 2 homicides that were justified by self-defense, murder was down 50% citywide during MSSP and with those cases included it was still down 33%. The greatest results occurred in the most problematic neighborhoods. Only one murder occurred in the five neighborhoods that were the focus of MSSP. This was in stark contrast to the 7 murders in these neighborhoods during July and August of 2004, an 86% decrease. Additionally, there did not appear to be any gang-related murders during what are traditionally the most active months for gang violence.

Aggravated assaults were the greatest challenge during MSSP. Although the percentage increase was partially driven by domestic assaults, shootings and non-domestic assaults continued to be a challenge. However, the number of people who were either shot or shot at declined during MSSP. This decrease is most likely attributable to direct pressure on gangs and timely efforts to prevent retaliation.

A resident of the Hawthorne Neighborhood may have summed it up best in an e-mail she sent encouraging officers from the STOP Unit;

*“...Because of your good work and dedication my child and I can sleep a little better at night. I know we have a long way to go, but because of people like you the community will become better one step at a time.”*

**Francisca Rivera  
800 Block of 31<sup>st</sup> Avenue North**

All of the partners involved in the Minneapolis Strategic Safety Partnership are committed to continuing our efforts to reduce violence in the City. This initiative demonstrated the power of developing a coalition of police, community, corporate, and non-profit agencies with a collective goal of improving the livability of our neighborhoods. It is now incumbent on us to learn from our experience, build on our successes, and prepare for the future.

## Challenges Encountered During MSSP

There were several challenges that arose during the planning and implementation of MSSP. These challenges should serve as lessons for future initiatives and as advice for other agencies that may want to replicate this effort.

- **Domestic Aggravated Assaults** – If the objective of future initiatives is to reduce all aggravated assaults, then the efforts need to include a component to address domestic aggravated assaults. This was not an area of focus in any of the community or police meetings during MSSP.
- **Narcotics Enforcement** – In the preliminary meetings and during MSSP it became obvious that there was a great deal of difference in opinions as to which units or agencies should be responsible for particular types of narcotics enforcement. It became clear that there was a tremendous amount of overlap in enforcement and there was significant disagreement as to the roles each entity should perform. The MPD is now conducting a Narcotics Enforcement Review to clarify the roles of each unit, and eliminate duplication of efforts.
- **Weapons Strategy** – The MPD did not have adequate resources dedicated to addressing in-custody weapons arrests or proactive weapons cases before or during MSSP. In spite of significant assistance from the ATF, the MPD became overwhelmed with weapons cases during MSSP. This limited the ability to conduct follow-up investigations targeting straw purchasers and other individuals who were supplying guns to gang members. The MPD is currently adjusting resources and developing a Weapons Strategy for 2006.

## Appendix A

### MSSP Momentum Tasks

#### Momentum Task for the Week of July 4<sup>th</sup>

- List of the 10 individuals in each of the assigned gangs or problem areas that are most likely to be involved in Murders or Aggravated Assaults
  - Full name and DOB
  - Most recent address
  - Probation status and name of P.O.
- Name of a Supervisor or Officer who will be responsible for coordinating efforts and knowing all of the players in each assigned gang or problem area & their contact numbers.
- Preliminary plan for targeting that gang or problem area.

#### Momentum Task for the Week of July 11<sup>th</sup>

- Develop and run a detail involving at least one other MSSP Unit and targeting an assigned gang and/or problem area on or before Saturday, July 16th.
  - Examples:
    - The NATF works with Lt. Weddell of the 3rd Pct. to target Little Earth and the Bloomington Avenue Corridor and Native gang activity. HCSO, Probation, USMS, ATF, etc. assist.
    - VOTF works with the ISAC Unit & 4th Pct. CRT to target an active gang at Lowry/Bryant.
    - 5th Pct. CRT & DP work with the STOP Unit to conduct probation visits on all members of an active gang on probation.

#### Momentum Task for the Week of July 18<sup>th</sup>

- (NOTE: At the time of this task we had seen a 21% increase in aggravated assaults in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct for the first 18 days of MSSP.)
- I want each SSP Unit (\*except 3<sup>rd</sup> Pct CRT & DP) to develop a brief strategy for assisting the 4<sup>th</sup> Pct. CRT Team with reducing violence on the Northside this week. Please send me a bulleted list by the end of today with 3 things your unit or DP shift will do this week (before Sunday) to help reduce violence in the 4<sup>th</sup> Precinct. The list might include warrant/pickup sweeps, buy/busts, directed patrol, targeted probation visits, saturation details, etc.. If you need ideas, call Lt. Hayhoe or Sgt. Mosey. An important part of the MSSP Initiative is to redirect resources as new peaks and patterns emerge.  
(\*3<sup>rd</sup> Pct CRT & Directed Patrol are exempted so that they can continue to maintain the reductions in 3's.)

#### Momentum Task for the Week of July 25<sup>th</sup>

- This week I would like each of the MSSP Units to develop and implement a detail to target customers of the gang members, prostitutes, or others that are supporting crime in the problem locations. Some examples might be;

- Reverse narcotics transactions to target buyers and seize vehicles.
  - John details to target customers of prostitutes.
  - Surveillance and arrests of individuals purchasing narcotics in problem locations or at known gang locations.
- Please send me a few bullet points by the end of the day tomorrow outlining the detail, who will be involved, and when you will execute it. Please keep good stats related to this detail. We are often asked about individuals who are coming from other cities or other neighborhoods to purchase narcotics or solicit prostitution. This will help us explain what we are actually seeing. When the detail is complete, please send the stats to me and Lt. Reinhardt.

**Momentum Task for the Week of August 1<sup>st</sup>**

- The Momentum Task for this week seems simple, but it is an important part of our strategy. I would like each MSSP unit or shift to have a brief meeting with all of their officers to answer the following:
  - Are the strategies we are using helping to reduce violence related to our gangs or problem locations?
  - What seems to be the most effective thing we are doing?
  - What seems to be the least effective thing we are doing?
  - What one thing are we going to try differently this week?
  - Do we need any additional help from other units or agencies?
- Please send me a brief list of your answers to these questions and a short update on what you plan to do this week.

**Momentum Task for the Week of August 8<sup>th</sup>**

- Please complete the task below and send it to me at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct by Monday, August 15<sup>th</sup>. Thanks.
  - Identify at least one officer or group of officers who have been involved in a significant incident or efforts to reduce violence since July 1<sup>st</sup>. Document their efforts on a “Recommendation For Award Form” (online) and forward it to me with all related CAPRS reports and any other documentation of their efforts. If they meet the criteria for a Medal of Honor, Valor, or Commendation, then check that box. Otherwise, make it a recommendation for a Chief’s Award of Merit.
  - Don’t hesitate to write more than one recommendation if you have different officers who are equally deserving.

**Momentum Task for the Week of August 15<sup>th</sup>**

- During the week of August 15<sup>th</sup> I would like each unit or shift to team up with probation and visit at least 3 of your most active gang members or problem individuals. These visits can be in conjunction with the regularly scheduled STOP/Probation shifts or you can arrange them separately. These visits need to be face to face and officers should specifically talk to the probationers about our goals of reducing violence.

## Appendix B

(All names have been changed & the report edited for sample purposes)

# MINNEAPOLIS POLICE INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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*No dissemination of this report can be made without the authorization of the originating unit or department*

Date: 08/01/2005

From: Officer Jeanine Brudenell

Re: **SSP Daily Intelligence (Includes entire weekend)**

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**05-204XXX Pct 4** On 7-28-2005 at 1030 hours a narcotics search warrant was conducted by VOTF at 32XX Dupont Avenue North. Narcotics were recovered.

**Arrested: James Lee Madison 1/12/89 "Town"** 32XX Dupont Avenue N.  
Documented as a Tre-Tre Crip in GangNet.

**Arrested: Donald John Jones 12/24/88** 32XX Dupont Avenue N.  
Documented as a Tre-Tre Crip in GangNet.

**Investigator: VOTF SSP Contact: Off. Sletta, ISAC, (612) 221-XXXX**

**05-204XXX Pct 3** On 7-28-2005 a uniformed squad stopped Smith and found him to be in possession of heroin. He was arrested for PC Narcotics.

**Arrested: Donald Louis Smith 1/6/82 "Donal"** 69XX 76<sup>th</sup> Avenue N., #3XX,  
Brooklyn Park.  
Documented as a GD in GangNet

**Investigator: Not Yet Assigned SSP Contact: Sgt. Duncan, ISAC, (612) 221-XXXX**

**05-204XXX Pct 4** On 7-28-2005 at 1200 hours the STOP Unit conducted a narcotics detail at 23<sup>rd</sup>/Lyndale Avenue North and arrested Yang for purchasing marijuana.

**Arrested: Lee NMN Vang 7/14/84 “Kevin”** Unknown Address  
Documented as an Asian Boyz in GangNet.

**Investigator: STOP Unit SSP Contact: MGSF Asian Team, (651) 917-XXXX**

**05-205517 Pct 4** On 7-28-2005 at 2020 hours the Narcotics Unit observed a drug transaction in the parking lot of the 200 Club at Broadway/Washington Avenue North. The arrested parties were stopped by officers in a vehicle after completing the drug transaction. Both were booked for PC Narcotics.

**Arrested: Cortez Leo Lewis 3/13/73** 27XX Brunswick Ln.,  
Crystal  
Documented Vice Lord in GangNet.

**Arrested: Rachel Michelle Green 2/22/83** 27XX Oliver Avenue N.,  
#XX

**Investigator: Sgt. Miller SSP Contact: Off. Brudenell, ISAC, (612) 685-XXXX**

**05-206XXX Pct 1** On 7-29-2005 at 415 Royalston Avenue uniformed officers came into contact with Black, who they had reasonable suspicion to believe was armed with a handgun. 5<sup>th</sup> Pct. CRT had disseminated that they had developed information from sources that Black was armed. A pat search of Black revealed that he had a gun in his pants pocket. He was booked for PC Weapons.

**Arrested: Collin Black Jr. 12/13/72** 11XX NW 1<sup>st</sup> St, Rochester  
Documented Gangster Disciple in GangNet.

**Investigator: Off. Sletta, ISAC SSP Contact: Sgt. Duncan, ISAC, (612) 221-XXXX**

**05-207XXX Pct 4** On 7-30-2005 at 0144 hours a uniformed STOP Officer conducted a TLE. During the identification process the officer observed a handgun on the driver. The driver was arrested for PC Weapons.

**Arrested: Lamont James Jensen 3/13/84** 34XX Fremont Av. N.  
Documented Young Thug in GangNet.

**Arrested: Jason Lee Mason 8/11/79 “Junior”** 28XX Irving Av. N.

**Passenger: Kevin Samuel Brown 11/17/83** 34XX Fremont Av. N.

**Investigator: Off. Mark Sletta, ISAC SSP Contact: Same**

**05-207XXX Pct 4** On 7-30-2005 at 1730 hours the victim was shot by the suspect while in a vehicle outside of 3456 Girard Avenue North.

**Victim: Michael Edward James 6/7/66 “Double-O”** 6XX Lowry Av. N., #XX  
Documented Rollin’ 30’s Blood in GangNet.

**Suspect: Tyson Larry Williams 1/22/85** 34XX Girard Av. N.  
Documented Family Mob in GangNet.

**Investigator: Sgt. Chambers, Assault SSP Contact: Off. New, (612)221-XXXX**

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