




Police

November 29, 2011

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



Why is this measure important?

Part 1 crimes are the eight crimes - homicide, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, auto theft, theft, and arson that are tracked nationally by the FBI. This information reflects both the most serious crime categories and the livability offenses of burglary and theft.

What will it take to achieve the target?

The MPD uses up-to-date crime data to project problem areas and target resources. In addition, the department uses record data bases and field intelligence to enhance their efforts. Putting resources in the right spots at the right times will prevent crime. Targeting top offenders will prevent further crime. Crime prevention is the ultimate goal. A crime prevented is always better than a crime solved.








Why is this measure important?


Violent crimes are a subset of Part I crimes - homicide, rape, aggravated assault and robbery. Violent Crimes are the most personal and dangerous crimes, and they are tracked nationally by all major agencies. Violent crimes have the largest impact on the general public's perception of safety.

What will it take to achieve the target?

Violent crimes are committed, to a large extent, by a small percentage of criminals. Twenty percent of the population we call criminals commit eighty percent of violent crimes. We combat violent crime by focusing on likely crime patterns and known violent offenders. When gangs are involved in violent crime, we focus on those gangs as well.









What strategy (or strategies) will you use to achieve this goal?

Robbery reduction is a four part strategy. First, the Strategic Information and Crime Management (SICM) Division staff uses predictive analysis to identify potential patterns and hotspots to help direct patrol resources to areas and persons most likely to be involved in robberies. Second, patrol resources employ effective proactive strategies to interrupt potential robberies by enforcing crimes that are typically precursors to robbery (e.g., narcotics, prostitution, street gambling and loitering with intent.) Our Robbery Unit investigates the robberies that do occur, putting greatest emphasis on those incidents that are most likely to, if solved, prevent future incidents. Finally, we use the CODEFOR process to ensure accountability and to make sure that the intelligence, tactics and deployment of resources we are using is effective.

What resources are needed to carry out your strategy?

The Robbery Unit currently has 5 investigators, down from 7 a year ago because we did not replace attrition, but we are able to supplement robbery investigators from other units in response to emerging trends and patterns. The personnel required to do proactive patrolling in the precinct varies, depending on the need to respond to other trends and patterns that arise in the precinct.






Why is this measure important?


In 2006, juveniles were responsible for a disproportionate number of our violent crime. As a result, preventing Youth Violence became a priority of the City of Minneapolis. Preventing youth crime is both a short and long term crime prevention strategy since juvenile offenders will soon become our adult offenders. It is important to have social or criminal justice interventions at the earliest point possible.

What will it take to achieve the target?

Juvenile crime has dropped over the past three years as a result of the city's focused efforts on juveniles. Reinstating the Juvenile Unit in 2007 has already yielded many results towards lowering juvenile crime. In the fall of 2008, the Minneapolis Public Schools awarded a five-year contract for School Resources Officers to the department. It is also very important that we try to keep kids in school. We focus on truancy and curfew enforcement to keep kids off the street and in school. Statistics have long showed that kids who graduate from high school are much less likely to end up in prison. This new effort will provide increased opportunity to work with juveniles in constructive activities. Partnerships with other agencies, PAL and other social agency efforts will also help maintain these gains.



Closure rate by type of crime



* Homicides are cleared/closed only with charging of a suspect turned over for prosecution or with the death of the offender
 Note: These statistics reflect a moment in time when many cases especially from the 4th quarter remain under investigation or review by the prosecutor. The charging rates at this time will not necessarily be predictive of year end outcomes as calculated at a later date.

Why is this measure important?


Case closure rates measure our successes in dealing with committed crimes. The rate reflects our prioritization of resources and our capacities within investigations. We need to balance our success in closing cases with our primary goal of preventing crime. Cases are considered “closed” in a variety of ways. We consider a case closed with an arrest or prosecution. They can also be closed as “unfounded,” “referred to another agency,” or due to lack of prosecution by the victim.

What will it take to make progress?

In most cases, improving case closure rates means adding personnel. However, that is not always the case. Case closure rates can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies or techniques, as well as the efforts of individual investigators.

Closure rates by type of crime

Homicide	Total	# cases Assigned	% of cases Assigned	# Charged	Charge rate	# Closed other reasons	Overall closure rate
2006	56	56	100%	44	79%	*Homicide reflects the charge rate. Charge rates are cleared/closed only with charging of a suspect turned over for prosecution or with the death of the offender	
2007	47	47	100%	33	70%		
2008	39	39	100%	23	59%		
2009	19	19	100%	11	58%		
2010	40	40	100%	23	58%		
2011 (thru Sept 30)	28	28	100%	12	43%		
Robbery	Total	# cases Assigned	% of cases Assigned	# Charged	Charge rate	# Closed other reasons	Overall closure rate
2006	3081	1112	36%	332	30%	95	38%
2007	2559	725	28%	338	47%	156	68%
2008	2066	628	30%	258	41%	148	65%
2009	1707	583	34%	247	42%	128	64%
2010	1626	701	43%	280	40%	112	56%
2011 (thru Sept 30)	1094	491	45%	122	25%	65	38%
Assault	Total	# cases Assigned	% of cases Assigned	# Charged	Charge rate	# Closed other reasons	Overall closure rate
2006	2868	1848	64%	378	20%	132	28%
2007	2579	1877	73%	410	22%	128	29%
2008	2387	1432	60%	402	28%	118	36%
2009	2176	735	34%	359	49%	150	69%
2010	2021	1516	75%	331	22%	150	32%
2011 (thru Sept 30)	1312	1062	81%	364	34%	241	57%
Burglary	Total	# cases Assigned	% of cases Assigned	# Charged	Charge rate	# Closed other reasons	Overall closure rate
2006	5856	1528	26%	331	22%	105	29%
2007	6178	1500	24%	296	20%	112	27%
2008	5599	1670	30%	379	23%	149	32%
2009	4746	1284	27%	350	27%	163	40%
2010	3680	831	23%	180	22%	85	32%
2011 (thru Sept 30)	3734	1001	27%	178	18%	191	37%




Why is this measure important?


This measure shows how long it takes us to get to a call from the time of the call. It is important for us to get to highest priority calls as soon as possible. Those are usually serious crimes in progress or emergency medical calls. Response times today are a very accurate measure of our ability to respond. Squads are tracked by a global positioning system, and our computer aided dispatch will find the nearest available squad.

What will it take to make progress?


If we believe that we have an appropriate percentage of our department assigned to patrol versus investigations and other functions, then response times give us a true measure of our department's capacity based on its current staffing.



Priority 1 response times by precinct



*2007 does not include 1st quarter data from previous CAD system




Why is this measure important?

In order to gain the whole picture in our efforts against violent crime we need to track gun usage. Looking at guns seized indicates effectiveness of police tactics, but incidents involving guns aid in our goal to track who has the guns and where are they coming from.

What will it take to make progress?

(See following measures regarding gun seizures)





Why is this measure important?

This measure can tell us about the likelihood of guns to be on the street and/or the effectiveness of our officers efforts to seize illegal guns from the street. The trouble is that we really don't know if it is more of a case of one versus the other. We do know that we would like to see gun seizures increase if gun violence is increasing. Ideally, we want to see both numbers drop because gun violence has dropped.

What will it take to make progress?

Collaboration is necessary to significantly reduce the number of guns on the street. Minneapolis police officers work with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). We are charging more gun cases, as well as tracing seized guns to ascertain the origin of purpose and identifying those known to have possessed the gun.






Why is this measure important?

The activity recorded here represents collaborated, targeted efforts by the Safe Streets Task Force to target violent offenders. These charges mean that very dangerous and active criminals who were previously committing crimes in our community will receive long federal prison sentences.

What will it take to make progress?

The evidence needed to achieve a conviction of a violent offender or a gang member can take months, even years, to collect. The investigations are labor and equipment intensive and expensive. The results of these efforts need to be “meaningful,” or in other words, justify our extreme efforts. The offenders convicted need to be major offenders whose absence on our streets reduces violent crime







Why is this measure important?

Again, our overall goal is to reduce juvenile violent crime. Measuring how many juveniles are involved in violent crime or shot is important for showing our progress.

What will it take to make progress?

As mentioned previously, we need an ongoing focus by precinct officers on truancy and curfew violations. We also need help from our investigators and other partners (community and law enforcement) to reduce juvenile violence.





Number of Youth Visits			
January 1, 2011-September 30, 2011			
Visits	Number of Youth	Percentage	Combined Percentages
1	1109	78.0%	92%
2	192	13.5%	
3	65	4.6%	
4	23	1.6%	8%
5	13	0.9%	
6	8	0.6%	
7	2	0.1%	
8	5	0.4%	
9	2	0.1%	
12	2	0.1%	

Number of Youth Visits			
January 1, 2010-December 31, 2010			
Visits	Number of Youth	Percentage	Combined Percentages
1	1206	89.3%	89.6%
2	245	7.3%	
3	74	2.2%	10.4%
4	31	0.9%	
5	18	0.5%	
6	10	0.3%	
7	9	0.3%	
8	11	0.3%	
9	3	0.1%	
10	6	0.2%	
11	1	0.0%	
13	1	0.0%	
15	1	0.0%	
17	1	0.0%	
19	1	0.0%	
20	1	0.0%	
21	1	0.0%	

Complaints filed with internal affairs and Civilian Review Authority						
Inquiry type	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 (Thru Sept 30)
IAU cases	67	60	78	55	52	38
Preliminary cases	133	111	110	121	113	43
Policy/procedure inquiry	160	103	133	152	98	62
Force reviews (critical incidents)	n/a	15	12	13	3	5
Supervisor force reviews (CAPRS)	872	1,234	1,156	1,562	1,781	1,325
CRA signed complaints (compare to IAU case count)	90	75	68	114	89	70
CRA preliminary cases (compare to preliminary case count)	332	329	391	469	397	271

Note: *In 2006, critical incidents were not counted separately from Internal Affairs

Why is this measure important?

Tracking complaints filed with Internal Affairs is an important measure of the integrity and accountability of the police department. Police officers are vested with the ability to take life and liberty when appropriate; in order to safeguard the public from the abuse of police powers, Internal Affairs receives and investigates complaints of alleged misconduct. In addition, they also automatically review all uses of force such as punches, kicks, mace and Taser uses, batons/impact weapons, and firearm deployments.

DEFINITIONS:

IAU Case: a full investigation into the complaint

Preliminary Case: an initial review of the complaint to determine further course of investigation

Policy/Procedure Inquiry: low-level (category A) violations; handled by precinct supervisors

Force Reviews: IAU-initiated reviews of significant force that may have resulted in death/great bodily harm




Supervisor Force Review: Used to review lower-level uses of force; reported by officer and then routed to officer's supervisor for approval and IAU for review

CRA complaints: Under City of Minneapolis statute, the public has the option to file their complaint with the Civilian Review Authority (a function of Civil Rights) or the police department's Internal Affairs, but not both.

What will it take to make progress?

Since approximately May of 2009, there has been a team in place that has been working very hard to establish the EIS system for the MPD. This project began on 1/1/2010. The Captain of Administrative Services has been coordinating this team effort, under the oversight of the Deputy Chief of Professional Standards.



APPENDIX





Part I and Part II Crimes

Offense	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 (thru September 30)
Homicide	47	56	47	39	19	39	28
Rape	429	475	475	392	430	449	262
Robbery	2,625	3,081	2,559	2,066	1,707	1,626	1,094
Aggravated Assault	2,471	2,868	2,579	2,387	2,177	2,021	1,312
Burglary	5,552	5,856	6,178	5,599	4,764	4,811	3,734
Larceny	13,033	13,166	13,246	12,815	11,392	11,703	9,104
MVT	3,944	3,710	3,209	2,439	1,856	1,925	1,254
Arson	223	246	192	157	139	114	89
Part I	28,324	29,458	28,485	25,894	22,472	22,701	16,877
Part II	36,676	40,294	38,184	35,135	33,325	31,942	23,119



Police related measures monitored by other departments





Police related measures monitored by other departments



Police related measures monitored by other departments




Police related measures monitored by other departments




Management Dashboard: Police


2011 Positions by Division (Staff total 992)




2011 Expenditures by Type: \$136.3 million



Revenue 2007-2011 (in millions)



Expenditure 2007-2011 (in millions)



Loss Prevention Data

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Workers Comp	\$1,546,042	\$1,709,008	\$2,237,225	\$1,901,170	\$1,974,443
Liability Claims	\$67,091	\$63,595	\$86,241	\$51,484	\$91,943

Average Sick Days Taken per Employee (*)

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Days	7.8	7.8	7.6	8.5	8.1

Workforce Demographics

Year	2003	2010
% Female - Sworn	16.37%	15.94%
% Employee of Color - Sworn	16.50%	18.92%
# of Sworn Employees	794	872
% Female - Civilian	63.21%	63.08%
% Employee of Color - Civilian	21.23%	18.46%
# of Civilian Employees	212	130

Overtime Costs

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Hours	-	-	-	-	-
Cost	\$5,627,239	\$2,776,272	\$3,524,625	\$2,757,529	\$2,491,684

Positions Vacancies

Year end	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Percent of Total	3.56%	2.18%	3.51%	5.00%	2.00%

Employee Turnover and Savings

Year end	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Turnover	4.73%	5.13%	5.09%	6.57%	6.65%
Savings	\$ (2,128,884)	\$ (2,061,516)	\$ (3,416,045)		
% of Budget	-2.08%	-1.78%	-2.76%		

Performance Reviews Past Due in HRIS

As of 1/25/11	100%
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Retirement Projections

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Number	61	17	21	20	28	23	50	41	58	46	45

Notes:

Average Sick Days taken per Employee

- A) Based on the payroll calendar year not the calendar year.
- B) Does not include employees who were in a suspended ("S") Pay Status at the end of a given payroll year.
- C) Includes employees who are in a paid ("P") Leave of Absence status and an unpaid Leave of Absence status ("L").
- (*) Traffic control moved from Regulatory Services to Police in 2006 and these employees are included in Years 2006 to 2008

Overtime Costs

- A) OT amount - Fiscol. Reconciled with CRS and Data ware house queries.
- B) Hours - based on HRIS management reports with payroll data

Workforce Demographics

- A) Includes employee counts at year's end for 2003 and 2007.
- B) Only includes active FT regular employees.

Employee Turnover and Savings

- A) Turnover Savings= \$Budgeted (personnel) - \$Actual (personnel)

Position Vacancies

- A) Includes only budgeted positions.

Retirement Projections

- A) The projected time an employee is eligible to retire is based on service time in HRIS. For employees who received pension service credit in other organizations, the actual year of retirement eligibility may be sooner than the projections show.

